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Challenging a mechanistic model of mental disorders 
 
A fundamental question in the philosophy of psychiatry is: What kind of things 
are psychiatric disorders? This issue is being discussed extensively in a 
philosophically oriented literature, but there is still no consensus as to the best 
answer. Can psychiatric disorders best be conceived of as; objects that exist in 
nature independent of psychiatric classifications (natural kinds, see, for 
example, Haslam, 2003; Cooper, 2004); scientifically constructed tools or 
instruments that help to achieve important goals (practical kinds, see, for 
example, Zachar, 2002); or maybe as kinds that are brought into being by 
societies and cultures through the practice of classifying human behavior as 
distinct kinds (socially constructed kinds, see, for example, Young, 1995)?  
Current assumptions, understandings and practices in the field of autism, I 
suggest, are compatible with a permissive account of natural kinds, namely the 
mechanistic property cluster (MPC) account of natural kinds recently proposed by 
Kendler, Zachar and Craver (2011) as the model for understanding psychiatric 
disorders in general. However, despite the attractiveness of a value-free 
mechanistic model, the MPC model has certain limitations. In this supplement 
to the previous chapter, I illustrate how these limitations relate to the traditional 
separation of two types of demarcation problems in (the philosophy of) 
psychiatry – between distinct mental disorders on the one hand, and between 
normality and pathology on the other hand. A mechanistic model of psychiatric 
                                                          
24 This supplement to Chapter 2 has been published as Verhoeff B (2013) The autism 
puzzle: challenging a mechanistic model on conceptual and historical grounds. 
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 8: 17.  
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disorders only concerns the former demarcation problem while it is indifferent 
with respect to the latter. Due to this limitation, this model is unable to account 
for the way in which social and cultural norms, and shifting boundaries of 
normality and pathology shape and transform autism as a psychiatric entity.  
 
 
Mechanistic property cluster (MPC) kinds 
 
In a recent essay in Psychological Medicine, Kendler, Zachar and Craver (2011) 
argue for a mechanistic model for understanding psychiatric disorders. Inspired 
by the philosopher Richard Boyd (1991; 1999) they suggest that psychiatric 
disorders can best be viewed as mechanistic property cluster (MPC) kinds. Boyd 
developed the concept of homeostatic property clusters (HPC) to challenge a 
stringent essentialist model of natural kinds in which a necessary and sufficient 
property or structure (an essence) directly and causally determines all key 
features of a kind (Kendler and colleagues replaced the term ‘homeostatic’ with 
‘mechanistic’ to avoid possible confusion due to different meanings of the term 
‘homeostatic’).    
According to Boyd, there are scientifically important kinds – biological 
species for instance – that are characterized by a cluster of often co-occurring 
characteristics and by the underlying mechanisms that bring about their co-
occurrence. These clusters do not have invariable and exclusive essences and 
the members of a kind do not need to overlap in a fixed set of characteristics. 
Rather, kind membership is defined by some set of empirically discoverable 
causal mechanisms that explain, in the case of biological species, ‘the 
imperfectly shared and homeostatically related morphological, physiological and 
behavioral features which characterize its members’ (Boyd, 1991: 142). Similar 
stable patterns of often complex causal mechanisms that involve interactions 
between multiple possible levels of explanation – such as physiology, behavior 
and environment – instantiate the imperfect co-occurring characteristics of the 
members of a species. They are considered imperfect because ‘kind definitions 
must conform to the (sometimes messy and complex) causal structure of the 
world’ (Boyd, 1991: 143). Members of a species need not share all their 
characteristics, and differences between species can be vague. However, this 
doesn’t imply that there are no stable explanatory mechanisms to be discovered 
underlying common characteristics of individual members of a species. 




Kendler, Zachar and Craver (2011) suggest that Boyd’s HPC model of kinds 
should be the key model for understanding what kind of things psychiatric 
disorders are. They ask us to consider a multi-dimensional matrix that reflects 
human mind/brain states. The properties included in this matrix may include 
genes, neural systems, psychological states, symptoms themselves and 
environmental inputs. They argue that there are only a finite number of 
mind/brain states that ‘are cohesive and temporally stable, some proportion of 
which represents “psychiatric syndromes”’ (p. 1147). For them, psychiatric 
disorders are best conceived of as sets of symptoms that are connected through 
a system of causal mechanisms. Ultimately, these causal mechanisms are what 
define and sustain the disorder.  
This MPC model of mental disorders is attractive for several reasons. It 
corrects an empirically inadequate ‘gene X causes disorder Y’ (essentialist) 
model, it is compatible with the multicausality, fuzzy boundaries and 
heterogeneity of most psychiatric disorders, and it provides (unlike pragmatist 
models) prescriptive guidance for the investigation of objective causal 
structures that will inform psychiatric nosology in the attempt to carve nature at 
its joints (ibid.). These joints are not located at the boundaries of single genes, 
infective agents or local lesions, but at the boundaries of causal mechanisms 
(Samuels, 2009). Thus, the MPC model facilitates the prospect of discovery and 
‘true’ delineation of specific disorders. Since MPC kinds are grounded in the 
natural features of the world and are ‘not merely imposed upon the world by 
psychiatrists through their classificatory practices’, psychiatric categories will 
become scientifically valuable in terms of prediction, explanation and control. 
Even though there is no single causal mechanism or essential property that 
explains all the superficial properties of a kind, ‘the identity of the disease 
across time and across cultures is grounded in the similarity of the complex 
mutually reinforcing network of causal mechanisms in each case’ (Kendler et 
al., 2011: 1147).  
Furthermore, as both Kendler, Zachar and Craver (2011) and Samuels 
(2009) – who defends an MPC model for delusions – underline, MPC kinds 
allow ‘that the same cluster of symptoms might arise from different etiological, 
underlying or sustaining mechanisms in different cases’ (Kendler et al., 2011: 
1147). There need not be a one-to-one relation between an underlying 
neurobiological causal mechanism and the resulting cluster of psychiatric 
symptoms. However, distinct etiological or pathophysiological mechanisms in 
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different members of the same kind must share a similar causal mechanism at 
another biological level. Biological heterogeneity is allowed, as long as more 
homogeneous mechanisms can be identified at other biological levels. Much of 
the research in autism is, despite profound genetic heterogeneity, directed at 
identifying unifying neural mechanisms that underlie all – or a subgroup of – 
autism cases. According to Samuels (2009), identifying such unifying 
mechanisms comprises perhaps the fundamental explanatory challenge for an 
MPC approach to psychiatric disorders. Kendler, Zachar and Craver (2011) 
conclude that we are ‘far from being able to define plausible stability-producing 
mechanisms for most psychiatric disorders’ (p. 1148).  
However, as Chapter 2 also illustrated, contemporary researchers in the field 
of autism generally, but usually unknowingly, follow the prescriptive guidance 
of the MPC model. A common neurodevelopmental abnormality is still 
assumed to unite all – or a subgroup of – autism patients. Functional genomics, 
epigenetics, molecular genetics and systems biology are among the new hopes 
in the search for autism’s unity. Current developments in autism research fit 
strikingly well with the MPC model proposed by Kendler et al. (2011). Autism 
researchers and clinicians need to deal with multiple causes and (genetic) 
heterogeneity, but autism research is nonetheless directed at identifying 
‘objective’ causal mechanisms that should inform nosologists in their attempt to 
carve autism’s boundaries at its supposed natural joints. However, a convincing 
mechanistic approach to autism requires a clear separation of two familiar types 
of demarcation problems in psychiatry.  
 
 
Two demarcation problems 
 
The first demarcation problem concerns the question of whether and when a 
certain constellation of signs and symptoms legitimately reflects a distinct 
category. Is schizophrenia, for instance, a valid disease category and to what 
extent is schizophrenia distinct from schizo-affective disorder, delusional 
disorder or any other (‘normal’) state or trait? A central term in this debate is 
validity. This is a complex construct with several meanings and subtypes, which 
I do not discuss here in detail. Rather, I briefly focus on how this term has been 
used in psychiatric nosology.  




Robins and Guze (1970) were the first to propose a formal method to 
improve the validity of psychiatric categories. In their influential article on 
establishing diagnostic validity for schizophrenia, they proposed five phases in 
the evaluation of a putative diagnostic category that they thought were an 
indication of its validity: clinical description, laboratory studies, delimitation 
from other disorders, follow-up studies, and family studies. These validators 
were used to show that ‘apparent “schizophrenia” with a good prognosis is not 
a mild form of schizophrenia, but is a different illness’ (p. 987). Their findings 
provided the basis for the distinction between schizophrenia and 
schizophreniform disorder in DSM-III (APA, 1980). Kendler (1990) expanded 
the set of validators and distinguished between antecedent validators (familial 
aggregation, premorbid personality, and precipitating factors), concurrent 
validators (including psychological tests), and predictive validators (diagnostic 
consistency over time, rates of relapse and recovery, and response to 
treatment).  
A common assumption underlying discussions about validity and proposals 
to increase the validity of psychiatric categories is that a ‘truly’ valid psychiatric 
disorder reflects genuine underlying (pathophysiological) differences in relation 
to other disorders and normal brain functioning. Kendell and Jablenski (2003) 
argue that while the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders is still based on clinical 
observation, a distinct syndrome will be valid if we reasonably expect that it can 
be defined by physiological, anatomical, chromosomal, histological or 
molecular abnormalities. Besides increasing reliability, since DSM-III the aim of 
psychiatric classification systems has been to create psychiatric categories that 
facilitate the identification of genes, neurotransmitter mechanisms and other 
neurobiological markers related to psychiatric disorders. In line with this aim, 
the ultimate goal of psychiatric taxonomy, as the research agenda for DSM-5 
Kupfer et al. (2002) concluded on this issue, has become ‘to translate basic and 
clinical neuroscience research relating brain structure, brain function, and 
behavior into a classification of psychiatric disorders based on etiology and 
pathophysiology’ (p. 70).   
The MPC model of psychiatric kinds is in line with this effort. By informing 
nosologists, the MPC model attempts to increase the validity of psychiatric 
categories, where validity depends on whether a certain psychiatric category 
captures genuine underlying differences. The MPC model is supposed to bring 
us closer to the ultimate goal of current psychiatric nosology, which is a system 
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based on etiology and pathophysiology with neuroscience providing the 
foundation for classification and possibly individual diagnosis. However, the 
MPC model and conventional discussions on validity are largely indifferent 
towards another central demarcation problem in psychiatry. This second 
demarcation problem which will be discussed below, concerns a more general 
question: How can the distinction between normal and pathological mental 
functioning be made?     
In a comprehensive monograph on this contested topic, Bolton (2008) 
discusses several possible ways to make this distinction. One way, for instance, 
is to conceive pathological mental functioning as ‘a matter of breakdown of 
meaningful connections in mental life’ (p. 16). Examples of a breaking down of 
meaningful connections include emotions that are excessive or have no 
appropriate object, behavior that is not under the control of the person’s will, 
and beliefs that have no basis in experience. Another possibility, inspired by the 
work of Jerome Wakefield (1992), is to conceive of pathological mental 
functioning as ‘not functioning as it has been naturally designed to do in the 
evolutionary process’ (Bolton, 2008: 17). Despite the value of some of the 
theories he discusses, Bolton concludes that there is not one single theory that 
adequately distinguishes all forms of mental pathology from normality. 
Furthermore, in line with a widespread consensus among philosophers of 
psychiatry, Bolton concludes that how the line between what is normal and 
what is pathological in mental functioning is drawn depends on social, cultural 
and individual values and circumstances. Even Jerome Wakefield (1992), who is 
considered to be on the naturalist side concerning mental disorders, 
acknowledges that a biological dysfunction needs to be harmful in order to 
become pathological, and harm cannot be understood independent of 
sociocultural circumstances.  
In defending the value-free MPC approach for delusions, Samuels (2009) is 
well aware of the two potentially conflicting demarcation problems. However, 
he argues that the normativity of pathology is not necessarily but only 
contingently connected with delusions. Without some reason to suppose that 
this connection is a necessary one, this normativity does not pose a threat to 
the MPC model regarding delusions (ibid.). Kendler, Zachar and Craver (2011) 
are equally aware of the evaluative nature of mental pathology as they 
acknowledge that ‘values are intimately involved in determining which 
psychiatric kinds deserve clinical attention’ (p. 1147). However, values are not 




only involved in determining whether the condition we have come to call 
autism deserves clinical attention, they are also involved in defining and 
delineating this psychiatric kind in the first place. Taking the distinction 
between normality and pathology into account is crucial for understanding the 
way in which autism emerged, transformed and is currently defined as a 
diagnostic entity.  
 
 
Limitations of a mechanistic model  
 
As Cooper (2010) convincingly argues, culture-bound syndromes that emerge 
in highly specific social and historical contexts can still be distinct ‘natural’ 
disorders. For instance, similar to different kinds of igneous rocks that are 
created under specific environmental conditions, a mental disorder can be 
influenced by cultural and environmental factors such as diet, lifestyle or 
environmental pollution, and still be a distinct natural (MPC) kind grounded in 
a network of causal mechanisms. Social and cultural factors can be considered 
as causal agents that become part of the entire network of causal mechanisms 
associated with the particular kind. Biology and culture may interact, Cooper 
argues, ‘so as to produce cases of a disorder that are recognizably and reliably 
similar to each other and such disorders can usefully be recognized by 
psychiatric classification systems’ (ibid.: 331).  
Following Cooper’s argument, putative culturally and historically specific 
causal factors (for example, child-rearing practices or environmental toxins) and, 
as a hypothetical consequence, varying prevalences or manifestations of autism 
all over the world would not necessarily threaten a mechanistic (MPC) model of 
autism. However, the fundamental requirement of the model, that the identity 
and boundaries of a particular disorder are set by causal mechanisms, is 
particularly problematic for autism. As Kendler, Zachar and Craver (2011) 
argued, ‘the identity of the disease … is grounded in the similarity of the 
complex mutually reinforcing network of causal mechanisms in each case’ (p. 
1147). ‘An MPC kind’ is their best answer to the ontological question: What 
kind of thing is a psychiatric disorder? However, the historically and culturally 
variable boundaries of ‘impairment of social interaction’ or ‘a lack of ability to 
understand and use the rules governing social behaviour’ – now considered 
essential features of autism – are clearly not set by causal mechanisms. This 
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issue of setting the boundaries of autism is not just a matter of demarcating a 
coherent cluster of signs and symptoms, it is also a matter of demarcating 
normality from pathology. 
Social and cultural values and norms not only influence whether a certain 
cluster of symptoms is considered as a disorder, but they play, in autism at least, 
a necessary role in what becomes a recognizable cluster of symptoms in the 
first place. Defining autism as a nosological entity incorporates the (shifting) 
needs and discontents of a society regarding how an individual interacts with 
others, empathizes, makes friends, seeks to share enjoyment, initiates small-talk, 
and figures out implicit social norms. This blurs the boundaries between the 
two discussed demarcation problems as demarcating autism (and identifying 
neurobiological dysfunctions related to autism) necessarily involves demarcating 
undesirable conditions. An MPC model of autism that attempts to ground the 




Mental disorder in DSM-5 
 
Both in the definition of mental disorder in DSM-IV (APA, 1994) and in the 
proposal by Stein et al. (2010) for a modified definition of mental disorder for 
DSM-5, the two discussed demarcation problems are reflected in separate 
criteria (see also Broome and Bortolotti, 2010; Verhoeff and Glas, 2010). In 
particular, criterion A, that a mental disorder is ‘a behavioral or psychological 
syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual’, implicitly concerns the first 
demarcation problem of whether a certain cluster of features legitimately 
reflects a distinct disease (Stein et al., 2010: 1761). Criterion B – ‘the 
consequences of which are clinically significant distress (for example, a painful 
symptom) or disability (i.e. impairment in one or more important areas of 
functioning)’ – refers to the second general problem of demarcating normality 
from pathological mental functioning.  
The separation of the two demarcation problems in different criteria is 
compatible with an MPC model of psychiatric kinds, in which a behavioral or 
psychological syndrome or pattern (cluster) reflects underlying 
(psychobiological) mechanisms. Whether it ‘deserves clinical attention’ 
(criterion B) can be approached as a separate issue. However, for autism, as we 




have seen, these two problems are inextricably linked to each other. The phrase 
‘in an individual’ in criterion A is particularly problematic for autism. As 
Broome and Bortolotti (2010) indicated, the phrase ‘in an individual’ is 
complex, controversial and carries conceptual baggage. It may seem evident 
that certain psychological states and behavioral patterns belong to or reside in 
an individual. However, as the case of autism illustrates, the recognition and 
description of an autistic behavioral pattern or particular autism signs and 
symptoms is profoundly embedded in a social and cultural context. Defining 
autism depends on historically and culturally variable ideas about deficiency, 
abnormality and dysfunction, and on the need to demarcate and treat particular 
discontents and impairments that have appeared. The case of autism, generally 
considered to be one of the most ‘biological’ of all mental disorders, illustrates 
Broome and Bortolotti’s (2010) suggestion: ‘that at the very least the claim that 





The mechanistic property cluster (MPC) model, which attempts to define and 
delineate autism in terms of causal mechanisms, is attractive for several reasons: 
it corrects an empirically flawed essentialist model; it is compatible with the 
multicausality, heterogeneity and fuzzy boundaries of many mental disorders; it 
provides prescriptive guidance for the investigation of objective causal 
structures; and it ‘satisfies the intuitions of reductionist psychiatrists’ (Kendler 
et al., 2011: 1148). Current autism research fits the MPC model strikingly well, 
as autism research – despite the acknowledged heterogeneity of the condition – 
is guided and regulated by the depiction of autism as a scientific and natural 
object that can be discovered and identified with systematic neuroscientific 
investigation. However, the MPC model of natural kinds (needs to) neglect(s) 
the way in which autism relates to ideas about what kind of behavior is 
inappropriate and in need of correction or support. As Chapter 2 argued, 
normative issues concerning disability and impaired social interaction have been 
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